Edward Carmona, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Southwest Airlines Company, Defendant - Appellee by Jones, Judge Edith Brown
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
ADAAA Case Repository Labor and Employment Law Program 
7-16-2008 
Edward Carmona, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Southwest Airlines 
Company, Defendant - Appellee 
Judge Edith Brown Jones 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/adaaa 
Thank you for downloading this resource, provided by the ILR School's Labor and Employment 
Law Program. Please help support our student research fellowship program with a gift to the 
Legal Repositories! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Labor and Employment Law Program at 
DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in ADAAA Case Repository by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Edward Carmona, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Southwest Airlines Company, Defendant - 
Appellee 
Keywords 
Edward Carmona, Southwest Airlines Company, 07-51071, Decision on Appeal, Disparate Treatment, 
Failure to Accommodate, Termination, Other physical impairment disability, Walking, Disability - Regarded 
as Having a Disability, Aerospace, Employment Law, ADAAA 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/adaaa/185 
REVISED AUGUST 14, 2008
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals 
Fifth Circuit
________  F I L E D
July 16, 2008
No. 07-51071
EDWARD CARMONA
Charles R. Fulbruge III 
Clerk
Plaintiff - Appellant 
v.
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COMPANY
Defendant - Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Texas
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and WIENER and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. 
WIENER, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant Edward Carmona sued his employer of fourteen years, 
Defendant-Appellee Southwest Airlines Company (“Southwest”), alleging sex 
discrimination, disability discrimination, and failure to accommodate. The 
district court dismissed Carmona’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
declining to reach the merits of his claims. As we disagree with the district 
court’s conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Carmona’s suit, we 
reverse and remand for consideration of the substance of Carmona’s 
discrimination allegations.
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I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Carmona worked as a flight attendant for Southwest from 1991 to 2005. 
The terms and conditions of Carmona’s employment were governed by a 
collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”) between Southwest and the 
Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, Local No. 556 (the “Union”). 
The CBA sets forth rules for leaves of absence, medical and sick leave, 
attendance, discipline and termination, and grievance procedures. Under the 
CBA’s attendance provisions, any employee who exceeds twelve attendance 
“points” within a rolling sixteen-month period is subject to termination.
From the beginning of his tenure with Southwest, Carmona suffered from 
psoriasis, a skin condition, and from psoriatic arthritis. These illnesses caused 
him to take leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”) roughly two 
or three times each month for three or four days at a time. In 2005, Carmona 
took additional absences “for illness,” which Southwest did not excuse under the 
FMLA. For these unexcused absences, Carmona accumulated points pursuant 
to Southwest’s attendance policy, and was disciplined by Southwest as a result: 
When Carmona received his seventh attendance point on May 1, 2005, 
Southwest issued him a “letter of counseling”; when Carmona accumulated his 
ninth point on May 10, 2005, Southwest issued him a written warning.
On June 22, 2005, Carmona injured his thumb at home. He called Carolyn 
Jernigan, a Houston Inflight Assistant Base Manager with Southwest, to report 
that he was going to the hospital and would be unable to fly that day. Carmona 
also requested a medical leave of absence. As mandated by the CBA, Jernigan 
instructed him to send a written request to Southwest together with supporting 
documentation from the hospital.
As a result of his thumb injury, Carmona missed four work days (June 22, 
23, 25, and 26, 2005). These absences moved his absence point total above 
twelve points, the maximum allowable under the CBA. After returning to work
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on June 27, 2005, Carmona faxed a doctor’s note to Southwest, which indicated 
that he was cleared to return to work as of June 25, 2005; but because Carmona 
had already used a doctor’s note for an earlier absence that quarter, provisions 
of the CBA prevented this note from excusing his absences between June 22 and 
June 26, inclusive.
By June 26, 2005, Carmona had exceeded the maximum of twelve points 
permitted under the CBA, making him subject to immediate termination from 
employment. As was Southwest’s practice, however, its Houston Inflight Base 
Manager, Kevin Clark, held a fact-finding meeting with Carmona, another of 
Carmona’s supervisors, and a representative of the Union to review Carmona’s 
point total. Clark determined that Carmona had actually accumulated even 
more points than the twelve originally calculated. The following month, 
Southwest terminated Carmona’s employment for excessive absenteeism.
Days later, Carmona followed the grievance procedures in the CBA and 
provisions in the Railway Labor Act (the “RLA”) by appealing his termination 
as being in violation of the CBA. At the final level of review, Carmona’s 
grievance was heard by a four-member panel of the Board of Adjustment, which, 
in March 2006, upheld Carmona’s termination.
In September 2005, Carmona filed a charge of discrimination with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”), alleging sex and 
disability discrimination. The EEOC dismissed Carmona’s claims, finding no 
evidence of sex discrimination and concluding that Carmona was not disabled 
within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”).
The EEOC issued Carmona a “right to sue” letter, after which he filed the 
instant action, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
(“Title VII”), disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the
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ADA, and retaliation in violation of the FMLA.1 Specifically, Carmona asserted 
that Southwest: (1) assessed him attendance points and denied him medical 
leave in situations under which similarly situated female flight attendants were 
not assessed points or were granted medical leave, and that similarly situated 
female employees have not been terminated for excessive absenteeism even after 
accumulating twelve points; and (2) discriminated against him because of his 
psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis and refused him medical accommodation when 
it assessed him points for his illness-related absences prior to his thumb injury.
In September 2006, Southwest filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), contending that the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Carmona’s claims were precluded by 
the RLA.2 In November 2006, the district court denied the motion without 
prejudice to filing a motion for summary judgment. In May 2007, Southwest 
filed a motion for summary judgment, reasserting its contention that Carmona’s 
claims were precluded by the RLA and further asserting that, if they were not 
precluded, Carmona’s claims were substantively without merit. The district 
court granted Southwest’s motion for summary judgment after concluding that 
Carmona’s claims were precluded by the RLA and dismissed Carmona’s action 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, the court did not reach the 
merits of Carmona’s claims. Carmona timely filed a notice of appeal.
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1 On appeal, Carmona has abandoned his FMLA retaliation claim.
2 As Carmona’s claims are based on federal statutes, the district court correctly 
characterized Southwest’s challenge to the court’s jurisdiction as questioning whether the RLA 
precludes, rather than preempts, Carmona’s suit. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 
U.S. 246, 259 n.6 (1994) (citing Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 
559 (1987)).
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s preclusion-based grant of summary judgment 
de novo.3 “Because the district court dismissed the complaint before reaching 
the merits, we confine our independent review to the jurisdictional issue.”4
III. ANALYSIS
Carmona has waived his right to appeal the district court’s dismissal ofhis 
ADA claim of failure to accommodate.5 As discussed below, however, because 
Carmona’s claims alleging (1) Title VII gender discrimination and (2) ADA 
disability discrimination cannot be resolved through an “interpretation” of the 
CBA, these claims are not precluded by the RLA.
A. Applicable Law
The RLA classifies CBA-related disputes as either “major” or “minor.”6 In 
1972, the Supreme Court held that minor disputes are exclusively within the 
jurisdiction of RLA adjustment boards.7 Six years later, the Court re­
emphasized that “Congress considered it essential to keep these so-called ‘minor’
3 See Taggart v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 F.3d 269, 272 (8th Cir. 1994).
4 Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166 F.3d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Vestron, Inc. 
v. Home Box Office, Inc., 839 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988)).
5 Carmona’s arguments against RLA preclusion are largely confined to his sex and 
disability discrimination claims. Carmona did not discuss failure to accommodate in any of his 
filings in the district court or in the first of his two briefs filed on appeal. He only raises the 
argument that his claim of failure to accommodate is not precluded by the RLA in his reply 
brief, after Southwest argued in its brief that Carmona had waived this argument. As we do 
not generally consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief, we hold that Carmona 
has waived his right to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his failure-to-accommodate 
claim. See, e.g., United States v. Prince, 868 F.2d 1379, 1386 (5th Cir. 1989).
6 Norris, 512 U.S. at 252-53.
7 Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 322 (1972) (“Thus, the 
notion that the grievance and arbitration procedures provided for minor disputes in the 
Railway Labor Act are optional, to be availed of as the employee or the carrier chooses, was 
never good history and is no longer good law.”).
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disputes within the Adjustment Board and out of the courts.”8 The Court 
defined minor disputes as disputes growing “‘out of grievances or out of the 
interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or 
working conditions.’”9 The “distinguishing feature” of a minor dispute “is that 
the dispute may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing [collective 
bargaining] agreement.”10 To state that a claim can be “‘conclusively resolved’” 
by interpreting a CBA “is another way of saying that the dispute does not 
involve rights that exist independent of the CBA.”11
Minor disputes “resist a rigid definition.”12 If Carmona’s claims can be 
resolved through an interpretation of the CBA, i.e., if the rights at issue do not 
exist independent of the CBA, his suit would qualify as a minor dispute under 
the RLA, and would be precluded from judicial review.
B. Merits
The district court concluded that Carmona’s allegations that Southwest 
did not assess negative attendance points under similar circumstances when 
flight attendants (1) were female, (2) were not disabled, or (3) had not requested 
intermittent FMLA leave, required interpretation of the CBA. As such, ruled 
the court, it qualified as a minor dispute and was precluded by the RLA.
On appeal, Southwest echoes the district court’s logic, insisting that 
Carmona’s claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the CBA. According to 
Southwest, interpretation of the CBA’s attendance policy, procedures for
No. 07-51071
8 Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978).
9 Norris, 512 U.S. at 252-53 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 151a) (emphasis added).
10 Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 305 (1989); see also 
Anderson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing id).
11 Norris, 512 U.S. at 265.
12 Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166 F.3d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1999).
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obtaining medical and sick leave, and discipline and termination procedures is 
required to evaluate whether (1) Carmona has established aprima facie case, (2) 
Southwest proffered a non-discriminatory reason for firing Carmona, and (3) 
Southwest’s stated rationale for terminating his employment was a pretext for 
discrimination. Southwest asserts that Carmona’s suit is a minor dispute 
because it can be resolved only through interpretation of the CBA.
Carmona, in contrast, insists that the district court erred in ruling that his 
claims require interpretation of the CBA and thus should be classified as a 
minor dispute under the RLA. Carmona acknowledges that it is necessary to 
refer to the CBA, particularly Southwest’s attendance rules, method for 
calculating attendance points, and procedures for obtaining medical and sick 
leave, to resolve his claims; but he asserts that his claims create no dispute over 
the meaning of any provision of the CBA. Stated differently, he insists that no 
interpretation of the CBA is required, only adjudication of the factual question 
whether Southwest was motivated by sex or his alleged disability (or both) in 
terminating his employment. According to Carmona, Southwest is attempting 
to “hide behind” RLA preclusion by equating his “straightforward” references to 
the CBA’s terms with CBA interpretation.
As a preliminary matter before addressing whether Carmona’s claims 
require CBA interpretation, we note that a CBA is not merely a simple, written 
contract. Although Carmona attempts to narrow the scope of how a CBA is 
defined to bolster his argument that his suit does not require CBA 
interpretation, a CBA encompasses more than its explicit, written provisions. 
The Supreme Court has held that a CBA includes not only written terms, but a 
broad range of implied, unwritten terms “arising from ‘practice, usage and 
custom.’”13 A CBA may encompass, for example,“a norm that the parties have
13 Norris, 512 U.S. at 264 n.10 (quoting Conrail, 491 U.S. at 311-12).
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created but have omitted from the CBA’s explicit language”14 or a working 
“‘condition [that] is satisfactorily tolerable to both sides’” and so “‘is often omitted 
from the agreement . . . .’”15 According to the Court, a CBA is “more than a 
contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen 
cannot wholly anticipate.”16 The CBA “covers the whole employment 
relationship.”17 Inasmuch as a CBA incorporates by reference more than just the 
content of its black-letter terminology, both disputes over explicit written 
provisions and disputes over implicit, non-written provisions of the agreement 
may qualify as minor and be precluded by the RLA.18
Even so, for the federal courts to have subject matter jurisdiction over 
claims like Carmona’s “do[es] not require that the CBA be irrelevant to the 
dispute; either party may still use the CBA to support the credibility of its 
claims.”19 Southwest’s contention that Carmona’s claims necessitate CBA 
interpretation fails to recognize the distinction between reference to the CBA 
and reliance on it. As noted, the “distinguishing feature” of a minor dispute 
under the RLA is that “the dispute may be conclusively resolved by interpreting” 
the CBA.20
As provisions of the CBA are relevant to, but not dispositive of, the 
resolution of Carmona’s claims, his claims do not constitute a minor dispute
14 Id. at 264.
15 Id. at 264 n.10 (quoting Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v. United Transp. 
Union, 396 U.S. 142, 154-55 (1969)).
16 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
17 Id. at 579.
18 Norris, 512 U.S. at 264-65.
19 Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1991).
20 Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 305 (1989) (emphasis
added).
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under the RLA. Even though a court would have to refer to the CBA to consider 
fully each of the alleged acts of disparate treatment, there is no disagreement 
about how to interpret these provisions of the CBA that detail Southwest’s 
procedures for assessing attendance, leave, discipline, and termination. 
Carmona’s factual allegations that unexcused absences by female flight 
attendants went unpunished, that remarks of his supervisors regarding male 
employees were discriminatory, and that his chronic illnesses were the real 
reason he was fired, do not bring the meaning of any CBA provisions into 
dispute. He alleges that CBA procedures were applied in a discriminatory 
manner, not that CBA procedures were fundamentally discriminatory. Thus, 
consideration of the CBA as applied to Title VII and the ADA — not 
interpretation of the CBA itself — is what is required to resolve Carmona’s 
claims.21
Southwest cites Reece v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., in which we held 
that a state claim of race discrimination was preempted by § 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, as support for the proposition that Carmona’s 
references to the CBA necessitate CBA interpretation.22 In reaching the decision 
in Reece, however, we noted that the plaintiffs claim “turn[ed] on questions of 
promotion, seniority, and assignment to training programs, all of which are 
provided for in the CBA,” and that the plaintiff directly challenged his
21 See Brown v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 654, 668 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A claim brought 
under an independent federal statute is precluded by the RLA only if it can be dispositively 
resolved through an interpretation of a CBA. This occurs only when a provision of the 
collective bargaining agreement is the subject of the dispute or the dispute is substantially 
dependent upon an analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, an 
employer cannot ensure the preclusion of a plaintiffs claim merely by asserting certain 
CBA-based defenses to what is essentially a non-CBA-based claim, or by arguing that the 
action challenged by the plaintiff is arguably justified by the terms of a CBA. Nor will a claim 
be precluded merely because certain provisions of the CBA must be examined and weighed as 
a relevantbut non-dispositive factor in deciding a claim or a defense.” (internal quotations and 
citations omitted)).
22 79 F.3d 485, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1996).
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employer’s rights under the CBA, all of which required interpretation of the 
CBA.23 Southwest has not identified any CBA provision in dispute or in need of 
interpretation to adjudicate Carmona’s claims, and neither have we. Carmona’s 
claims do not turn on the CBA, so Reece is inapposite to Southwest’s contention 
that the instant matter requires CBA interpretation.
In addition, the realization that Carmona is seeking to enforce his federal 
statutory rights under Title VII and the ADA, not his contractual rights 
embodied in the CBA, bolsters the contention that Carmona’s claims do not 
require CBA interpretation. Other circuits have held that claims grounded in 
federal statutory rights are generally not precluded by the RLA. The Ninth 
Circuit, for example, has held that anti-discrimination claims brought under 
Title VII and the ADA are independent of the CBA, so they do not qualify as 
minor disputes.24 Similarly, the First and Eighth circuits have held that ADA 
rights are independent of the RLA and are therefore outside the ambit of 
disputes classified as minor.25 Even though Carmona’s action involves statutory 
rights that exist independent of the CBA, we do not cite these decisions of other
23 Id. at 487.
24 Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166 F.3d 1272, 1277 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that ADA 
claim is independent of CBA and thus minor dispute); Felt v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. 
Co., 60 F.3d 1416, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that Title VII claim is independent of CBA 
and thus minor dispute).
25 Ralph v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 135 F.3d 166, 171 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that “the 
present controversy concerns the plaintiffs rights under state and federal statutes which exist 
independently of the collective bargaining agreement and do not require interpretation of that 
agreement”); Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1115 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
plaintiffs ADA claim is not preempted by RLA because plaintiff “seeks to enforce a federal 
statutory right, not a contractual right embodied by the collective bargaining agreement”); cf. 
Brown, 254 F.3d at 667-68 (“It remains true as a general rule that the RLA will not bar a 
plaintiff from bringing a claim under an independent federal statute in court (because such 
claims are generally independent of the CBA and will be adjudicated under non-CBA 
standards). However, this rule no longer applies if the federal claim asserted by the plaintiff 
depends for its resolution on the interpretation of a CBA. Such claims are not ‘independent’ 
of the CBA regardless of their source, and are therefore precluded by the RLA.”).
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circuits to suggest that the source of the rights asserted in a union member’s 
claims determines absolutely whether his action is precluded by the RLA. We 
are persuaded, however, that the fact that Carmona’s claims allege Title VII and 
ADA violations, as opposed to violations of the CBA itself, further evidences that 
the instant suit does not require CBA interpretation.
We recognize that compelling federal policies encourage the arbitration, 
not the litigation, of CBA-related disputes between employers and their 
employees. “Congress’ purpose in passing the RLA was to promote stability in 
labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for 
resolving labor disputes.”26 Notwithstanding this preference for arbitration, we 
are convinced that Carmona’s claims do not require interpretation of the CBA, 
only reference to it. As Carmona’s suit does not advance claims that constitute 
a minor dispute, it is not precluded from judicial review by the RLA.
IV. CONCLUSION
We hold that because Carmona’s allegations of Title VII sex discrimination 
and ADA disability discrimination do not require interpretation of the CBA, they 
do not constitute a minor dispute precluded by the RLA. Consequently, the 
district court erred in holding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to 
hear Carmona’s claims. We REVERSE and REMAND to the district court for 
consideration of the merits of Carmona’s claims.
26 Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994) (citing Atchison, Topeka 
& Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 (1987)).
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